The pause in Israel’s war on Gaza between 24–30 November 2023, along with each side’s release of a limited number of hostages and prisoners, could not have taken place without Qatar’s mediation efforts in what United States President Joe Biden acknowledged as a ‘critical partnership’.
Qatar has over the past three decades mediated several high-profile conflicts that have brought it unparalleled attention. This is remarkable given the commonly accepted assumption that small states, particularly from the Global South, are inherently limited in their power to act as third parties during conflict. Lacking an understanding of Qatar’s motivations, it is easy for outsiders to dismiss its efforts as mere ‘chequebook diplomacy’. Despite varied experiences in Qatar’s mediation efforts, common themes and patterns can be distilled into what could be termed ‘the Qatari way’ in terms of motivation, modality and acceptance.
Overview of Qatar’s mediation
Following the 2006 July war between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon, Qatar’s opposition to Israel elevated its status in the Arab world, bridged Sunni–Shiite divisions across the Middle East and bolstered its image both regionally and globally. Between 2006 and 2010, Qatar found itself involved in the mediation of multiple conflicts, benefiting from factors such as its lack of the historical baggage associated with traditional regional mediators like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularly evident in Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen.
From 2011, however, Qatar’s interventionist role in the Arab Spring and its aftermath – and the severe criticism this drew from within the region – complicated its positioning as a mediator. The blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt in June 2017 on the basis of allegations of Qatari support of militant groups made Qatar itself a subject for mediation, as regional (Kuwait and Oman) and international parties (European Union and US) attempted to resolve the Gulf crisis.
Despite the rising tensions in this period, Qatar was meanwhile skillfully positioning itself as a mediator between the US and Taliban, capitalising on its previous efforts in hosting the Taliban political office (2013) and securing the release of five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay in exchange for US soldier Bowe Bergdahl (2014). Significantly for Doha, the US–Taliban talks ensured active US and international engagement throughout the years of the blockade and ushered in a renewed role for Qatar as a trusted destination for conflict mediation.
More recently, Qatar’s mediation efforts extended to Chad, culminating in 40 opposition groups agreeing a roadmap to a national dialogue process in 2022. Additionally, Qatar hosted secret negotiations between the US and Venezuela, leading to a temporary suspension of US sanctions. It also helped secure the exchange of five American and five Iranian prisoners. The deal involved the unfreezing of US$5.9 billion in Iranian assets held in South Korea. Between October and December 2023, Qatar headed talks with Moscow and Kyiv to facilitate the return of 10 Ukrainian minors as a pilot for the safe return of a large number of Ukrainian children who had been unlawfully deported from Ukraine to Russia.
Motivation for Qatar as a mediator
Security and stability, broadly conceived, are critical drivers of Qatar’s interest in mediation – from both external and internal perspectives. The state mediates conflicts in the Middle East to stabilise the region. This is expected to reduce external threats such as terrorism or population displacement, ensure a conducive business environment and, in the words of the former Qatari Prime Minister, allow international diplomatic efforts to focus on the core issue facing the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Qatar’s prosperity is built on its export of liquefied natural gas, which flows via the Hormuz Strait, linking regional stability with Qatari national security. The combination of its geographical location and wealth leaves it with no option but to pursue an independent foreign policy among bigger and stronger neighbours that are often at odds with each other (Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia).
Qatar also feels a moral and religious compulsion to act as a regional peacemaker. The Holy Quran states that ‘if two groups of Muslims fight against each other, reconcile them’ [Surah al-Hujurat 49:9]. And Qatari officials make it clear that the moral and religious compulsion of the former Emir to act as a regional peacemaker contributed to the emergence of mediation as a major element of foreign policy. Outside observers, on the other hand, have argued that Qatar intervenes in conflicts to raise its profile as part of a concerted branding effort.
Qatar’s mediation modalities
Qatar’s mediation modalities have been diverse, including both classic track one diplomacy in Yemen, Lebanon and Chad, and, in Darfur and Afghanistan, a combination of track one efforts with track two dialogue with community and civil society leaders. Similarly, Qatar has acted as both solo mediator and as part of a coalition, working closely with the African Union, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Qatar demonstrates an ability to switch smoothly between simple facilitation of talks – offering generous venue and logistical support – and more involved mediation – setting up agendas and making proposals. In fact, most of its long-term processes, such as on Afghanistan, Chad and even Darfur, started with Qatar playing a facilitation role and agreeing to act as formal mediator only after receiving an official request and or approval from the parties to the conflict. This is consistent with Qatar’s objective of maintaining impartiality, creating trust, and ensuring that mediation processes are voluntary and that the resulting agreements are owned by the disputing parties.
Qatar’s mediation remains exclusively state driven. It is usually led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and/ or the Amiri Diwan (the administrative office of the Amir) and its associated advisers, including the National Security Adviser. The latter tend to focus more on mediation for hostage release and or prisoner exchange. Consistent with recommendations in a paper written by the author for the Brookings Institution, the foreign ministry in 2016 initiated a process of professionalisation of its mediation capacity. This included a new Special Envoy for Counterterrorism and Mediation in Conflict Resolution to act as Qatar’s chief mediator and coordinate efforts between other agencies. Attempts to deepen capacity through training male and female mediators as well as opening greater possibilities for younger diplomats to be involved are in progress in the foreign ministry’s Diplomatic Institute.
Qatar’s wealth and its foreign ministry’s ability to take decisions without being questioned or scrutinised by the public has meant that it can act decisively whenever there is a need to incentivise an agreement. Sizeable investments in Lebanon, Yemen and Darfur played a role in securing agreement. In recent years, this modality of inducement has been avoided, partly because experience demonstrated that many of the investments made were not sustainable.
Acceptance of Qatar as a mediator
Qatar is accepted as a third-party mediator in regional conflicts in no small part due to its advantageous geographical location and cultural affinity within the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as its friendly connections with numerous states. A fundamental pillar of Qatar’s foreign policy, according to a senior Qatari mediation official, is a belief that ‘maintaining channels of communication’ and focusing on issues rather than personalities and attitudes is the ‘only constructive way to engage in politics in our globalised environment, where trade, investment and politics are closely aligned’. Qatar has retained comprehensive diplomatic and trade connections with both Western and Eastern countries, North and South, even with some of those with whom it has troubled relations (Qatar was the first Arab country to open a Trade Office for Israel following the Oslo agreement). This extensive connectivity – Qatar Airways flies direct to more than 90 countries – has maintained Qatar’s ability to act as a bridge.
Furthermore, Qatar’s active engagement in international organisations and hosting of diplomatic summits strengthens its position as a competent global mediator. The Doha Forum was launched in 2003 to promote dialogue among world leaders, policy makers, and academics in the aftermath of 9/11 and has established itself as a leading platform to discuss critical challenges facing the world.
Qatar’s pursuit of an independent trajectory in foreign affairs is combined with a unique ability to maintain lines of communication with a wide array of actors. It is remarkable that in Doha controversial and opposed actors can co-inhabit a space of a few square kilometers, with the offices of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, the Taliban and Al Jazeera near the US Central Command (CENTCOM). It is important to understand that Qatar’s hosting of non-state actors is always done in close coordination with other states (particularly the US) and exclusively as part of a longer-term mediation roadmap, and not out of ideological sympathy. Their political offices operate under strict conditions, including the prohibition of raising funds or engaging in direct support of military acts, and require an indication of serious engagement in political processes to justify their maintenance in Doha.
Qatar’s foreign policy frequently entails maintaining an equal distance from all sides in a conflict, but without shying away from expressing a position where necessary, often in line with international law. This ‘principled impartiality’ aims to allow Qatar to gain the trust of opposing parties while maintaining its respect for international law.
A case in point is Qatar’s declared position on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The fact that Qatar called on Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and provided Ukraine with US$100 million of humanitarian assistance did not stop Russia from accepting Qatari mediation on the return of Ukrainian minors.
Similarly, while Qatar did not endorse Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October, it immediately issued a statement that held Israel responsible due to the occupation and later accused it of breaches of the Geneva conventions and even genocide. Nevertheless, Qatar’s history of providing transparent reconstruction assistance to Gaza (just under US$1 billion over the last 18 years) – via Israeli banks and with a full oversight by Israel’s authorities – combined with being a reliable and strategic partner of the US, helped facilitate Israel’s acceptance of Qatari mediation when it came to the release of the Israeli captives held by Hamas.
