Two factors contributed to China’s longstanding dormancy in the field of conflict mediation. First, until the early 2000s, China’s global presence, especially in conflict countries, had been limited. The second was its principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, strongly defended not least to hold firm against potential foreign intervention in its own affairs, such as the ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet. The Cambodian Peace Process in the early 1990s was an exception, but also an example of a conflict in which Beijing had significant interests, and where a mandate from the UN Security Council gave legitimacy to intervention.

Fast forward to the 2010s, by when China’s global economic engagement made it impossible to evade involvement in many conflicts in less developed countries. The inevitability originated from China’s search for raw materials, such as oil, to fuel its domestic economic growth, drawing it into resource-rich countries prone to internal instability, including Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Myanmar among others. Very quickly, China found its national interests intrinsically entangled in the domestic conflicts of these countries. Staying aloof was no longer an option.

Beyond economic issues, there are also other interests at stake, including China’s great power image and its security. China’s relationship with authoritarian leaders has won Beijing lucrative economic agreements but they are not cost-free. Before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, for example, the conflict in Darfur and China’s cosy relationship with Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir inflicted reputational damage on China’s international image. Similarly, China had a comfortable relationship with the Burmese junta before the 2010 elections. But when the power dynamics in Myanmar began to shift, the ensuing conflicts in the country took a direct toll on China’s border security, sending tens of thousands of refugees into the bordering Yunnan province and leading to Chinese civilian casualties. These forced China to take a more hands-on approach toward the conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar, pressuring the authorities to accept the joint United Nations– African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and negotiations with ethnic armed groups, respectively.

With China’s close relationship with authorities in the conflict countries, foreign demand for China to play a bigger role in ending conflicts grew; China also started to see peacemaking as a source of great power leadership, credibility and influence. The Saudi-Iran peace deal announced in Beijing in March 2023, following rounds of talks facilitated by Iraq and Oman, represents a significant advance in China’s perception of the benefits of mediation as a foreign policy instrument that attests to and elevates its diplomatic capability.

There are several distinct features to China’s approach. First, China’s role is more faciliatory than mediatory: Beijing is more interested in laying the political groundwork and providing political and logistical support to make the dialogue happen than setting agendas or designing or promoting a specific resolution to the conflict itself. Unlike its Western counterparts, China consciously chooses to stay clear of political processes such as democratic elections or power sharing, or issues such as women’s rights. Instead, China will facilitate the conditions for dialogue, but leave the parties to the conflict to determine their own course and solution.

Second, China uses its influence to provide incentives for dialogues to happen and bear fruit. Such incentives include both intangible pressure from its involvement as a great power and tangible rewards resulting from a breakthrough. For example, when China positioned itself as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran, its presence alone increased the pressure for the two sides to reach some type of deal for fear that failure to do so would affect their relations with Beijing. Similarly, when such deals are reached, it is almost guaranteed that the parties can count on China to provide rewards in economic and/or diplomatic fields.

Third, China’s vision for conflict resolution always has an element of economic development – for example, its prescription of a three-step solution to the Rohingya crisis: ceasefire, repatriation and then economic development. The emphasis on economic development reflects China’s consistent argument that poverty is the core source of instability, as well as its own experience and conviction of performance legitimacy – that economic development provides the foundation for political legitimacy even without democratic elections, and that development and stability are complementary. Beijing has ample incentive to play a role in post-conflict reconstruction, and so this approach could potentially be politically useful and economically lucrative for China as well.

Despite its nascent interest in conflict mediation, China is not yet a frontrunner in the field and is experimenting with different strategies to use its positions and influence to shape the future of conflicts. Its role will primarily focus on facilitation of peace talks and post-conflict economic reconstruction. It is becoming less constrained by its own ‘non-interference’ principle, but still is far from taking coercive political or military action to impose peace.