This section dives deeper into how pastoralists organise and network to manage and move herds peacefully and productively in borderlands and across borders of northern Nigeria, and explores patterns of insecurity and response in selected borderland areas, based on field research. It is structured around the three main geographies of the fieldwork.

First it looks at the Nigeria–Cameroon borderlands: how cross-border pastoral migration and transhumance is largely managed peacefully along the Nigeria–Cameroon border through different forms of networking and organisation, facilitated by kinship and other cross-border ties and institutional structures. However, migrating herders are vulnerable to exploitation by local and state officials on both sides of the border. Much pastoralist migration is eastwards out of Nigeria as a result of pressure on land and insecurity. Fieldwork in Cameroon, carried out by two research teams working in different locations, recorded that herders moving from Nigeria were regarded as law abiding but that the large number of livestock they were migrating with were exacerbating grazing pressures in some areas, with potential for creating tension.

Second it presents a short case study that documents systems, arrangements and agreements to facilitate peaceful pastoralism across the border between Nigeria and Niger Republic. Pastoral mobility has been an effective way to cope with shifts in available grazing land and to climatic and environmental change. In the dry season there has been increased integration between irrigated cropping, horticulture and pastoralism in some of Nigeria’s border states with Niger. This has brought a measure of cooperation to social relations between herders and farmers in those areas and has reduced southwards transhumance movements in the dry season from those particular locations.

A third borderland case study looks at Nigeria’s Borno State and at the Chad Basin more widely: at how pastoralists and other communities have been affected by the Boko Haram insurgency – including different forms of Boko Haram violence and administration, and the blurring of lines between insurgency and criminality; and at how herders have been killed or uprooted by the insurgency, or have found ways to live alongside it, and in some cases have joined it.

Borderlands of Nigeria and Cameroon

This section draws primarily on fieldwork carried out in the Nigeria–Cameroon borderlands.

Patterns and causes of cross-border movement

In the Nigeria–Cameroon borderlands, XCEPT researchers encountered nomadic herders who had migrated long distances across Nigeria to reach Cameroon – from places such as Niger State, Kogi State, and Kwara State in the north-central zone – in some cases over the course of a year or more. They migrated gradually so that their cattle adapted to changes in the environment along the way. In Fulfulde this process of migration to relocate on a long-term basis from one region to another is called perol, which is distinct from transhumance – the seasonal movement of herds. These migrating pastoralists typically had large herds of cattle and in some cases several families travelled together to Adamawa and Taraba States so that they could cross from there into central Africa to relocate.³⁹

In most cases, herders moving across borders have relatives in both countries, and kinship ties along migration routes are often vital for getting information and supporting and facilitating their arrival in a new area peacefully and safely. XCEPT researchers also interviewed herders moving into Cameroon from southern and north-central Nigeria who did not have strong family connections in central Africa, and were pioneering a change of location for their families and herds. After crossing the border into Cameroon, many herders continue further into central Africa – mainly to the Central African Republic (CAR), in some cases to Chad, and potentially beyond to northern Democratic Republic of Congo. The attraction of the CAR is the vegetation, as it reportedly has excellent pastures. But this in counter-balanced by instability, which is actually forcing some herders to return from the CAR back to Cameroon and increasingly to Nigeria itself (see below, including Boxes 7 and 8).

There are several routes that herders follow from Nigeria to Cameroon, most of them through Taraba and Adamawa states. One of the main routes is across the Mambilla Plateau in Sardauna LGA, south-east Taraba. XCEPT researchers interviewed migrating and resident herders around the Mambilla Plateau. A herder who lived on the Cameroon side of the border explained how he facilitated the movement of herders across the border, guiding them and negotiating their payments to border guards and local ‘gatekeepers’, including local pastoral leaders. This Jauro Dimndol (Fulfulde for ‘head of migration’) would go to Maraba Baissa, a meeting point in Kurmi LGA of Taraba State where pastoralists intending to cross to Cameroon would congregate. He would guide them on foot, with their animals, through Kurmi and Sardauna LGAs and across the border.⁴⁰

These herders had not experienced violence or clashes with farmers. Some cattle routes were narrowed in places due to pressure from farms, but the herders divided themselves into smaller units to adapt. Some went ahead to see conditions in the CAR before deciding to migrate, or linked up with family members already there, while others were going based on what they had heard.⁴¹ Pastoralists have to pay officials on each side of the border to be able to cross with their animals and gain the necessary papers. Immigration officials usually demand proof of identity and payment, but there are many other informal and formal charges as well.⁴² The amounts herders reported paying to state officials and local chiefs during their time in Cameroon, including at the border, to get the necessary papers and permissions amounted to thousands of dollars for those with larger herds.

It was clear that the process of migration has changed due to a combination of pressure on land (with diminishing access to grazing land in Nigeria) and as a result of increasing insecurity, necessitating these long-distance movements. The livestock are herded on the hoof from different parts of Nigeria to the Cameroon border. This migration is carried out by young herders with one or two older men either present or visiting them along the way to check on them. In some cases, young women, usually the wives of herders, also migrate on foot, but in general the household unit no longer migrates together. This represents a change in the migration practice which was common in the past – even a decade ago – where the entire family migrated on foot with their belongings carried by pack animals (bulls and donkeys).

There are very few families migrating in that way across the border now. Increasingly, livestock are herded on foot through the countryside, while the women, young children, and elders travel in vehicles. At least some of them reconvene with the herders (their sons or husbands) and the family’s cattle at the border before continuing. The women look after the family while on the move and help facilitate the logistics of the migration in important ways. Young men and boys left in charge of grazing their family livestock – and in some cases as hired herders – are away from their parents and elders for longer periods of time now than in the past. This has happened as families have increasingly settled while at the same time the mobility of herds has continued, or even increased, to find accessible pasture land and water.⁴³

The change in the organisation of pastoralism, land alienation and increased constraints over access to land and water, and the hostile political context that herders often face, are important reasons for farmer-herder conflicts. Each herding group has a leader, but if there is a dispute with farmers, or in cases where herders are kidnapped or their cattle are stolen, other family and kin members will usually intervene to try and resolve the case. The way that such issues are handled depends on the situation and on the relationship between individuals and between the herders and the local communities in the location of the dispute or incident.⁴⁴

Herders tend to have very good information networks and use mobile phones to find out about grazing conditions and the security situation in the places they are considering migrating to and along the routes they plan to follow. As pastoralists are widely dispersed and mobile, maintaining social networks is crucial for obtaining information and supporting each other. In the modern context, phone calls help sustain these relationships, and – when distance is not an obstacle – face-to-face meetings in markets and visits to each other’s camps are also important. Before a significant migration or transhumance movement, scouts are usually sent ahead to assess the conditions along the way and at the intended destination. Pastoral movements therefore tend to be well planned. Mobile phones enable herders to communicate with each other across long distances and if there are problems or in cases of violent conflict, they are used to plan a response. Phone calls also allow herders to speak to pastoral leaders or relatives in the places they are migrating to, which can be important when moving with cattle into a new area.

Fieldwork on both sides of the Nigeria–Cameroon border found that the main direction of pastoral movement was from Nigeria to Cameroon. Some herders crossing the Nigeria–Cameroon border with their cattle are doing so on a temporary basis, mainly for dry season grazing, while others are carrying out what they intend to be a permanent migration, with their families and livestock, from Nigeria into Cameroon, often en route to CAR as the potential destination. XCEPT researchers did not find herders originating in central Africa attempting to relocate to Nigeria. There were hardly even cases of seasonal cross-border transhumance into Nigeria by herders based in Cameroon. There was however a growing trend of herders who had migrated from Nigeria to the CAR, or in some cases to Cameroon, but had decided to return to Nigeria (discussed below).⁴⁵

Security, insecurity and conflict

Cross-border movement from Nigeria into Cameroon is in part driven by insecurity and conflict, but is itself largely peaceful and is not currently contributing to significant violence. During a month of intensive fieldwork in multiple sites in Cameroon, with two research teams working in different border locations, there were no reports of violent conflicts between nomadic pastoralists from Nigeria and either local pastoralists or farmers. Those coming from Nigeria were not perceived to be involved in criminality or violence. However, increased pastoral movement into Cameroon is exacerbating tensions in some areas, mainly linked to increased pressure on land. State authorities, along with local herders and farmers all confirmed that the impacts of cross-border movement are being strongly felt.⁴⁶ Nomadic herders crossing from Nigeria tend to come with large numbers of cattle – sometimes several hundred animals in a migrating group. Local cattle can be lost in the migrating herds – a key complaint of local pastoralists.

Box 7: Testimony from pastoral leaders in Cameroon

At a local Fulani leader’s house in Ndokayo, an important transit point for cross-border pastoralists in the East Region of Cameroon, XCEPT researchers met a nomadic herder from the Daneeji’en clan who had migrated there from Niger State, north-central Nigeria. He was the leader of his migrating group and had relocated to Cameroon with 50 members of his family and 1,700 cattle. They had been given land in Cameroon near the border with CAR to graze their animals on, and his family had settled in Ndokayo where the children were attending school. They took three years to migrate from Bida (Niger State in Nigeria) to Ndokayo, crossing the whole of central Nigeria through Taraba and Adamawa States to the Adamaoua Region of Cameroon and then to Cameroon’s eastern border. The reasons he gave for leaving Niger State were insufficient land to graze his animals, an increase in violent conflicts between farmers and herders, discontent with the local political situation, large-scale agricultural practices conducted without consideration of pastoralists, and insecurity from bandits, especially kidnapping for ransom and cattle rustling.⁴⁸ This is just one story out of many that researchers encountered in the field in Cameroon.

A vivid account given by the Sarkin Fulani in Ngaoundal (Adamaoua Region, Cameroon) – also a major migration route for cross-border pastoralists – illustrates the social dynamics between the nomadic herders and the local herders in the areas they pass through.⁴⁹ He was in his 60s and is the head of the pastoralists in Ngaoundal and surrounding areas. His grandparents migrated from Nigeria but he had never been there. According to him, most of the pastoralists around Ngaoundal have been there for a long time. But there are passers-by: pastoralists who are mostly Nigerians and use Ngaoundal as a transit point to CAR.

The host pastoral communities – the local Fulbe in the area – are not very friendly towards the nomadic groups, due to competition for grazing. The local herders claim that the migrating nomads often camp for a long time and will only leave when all the pasture has been grazed. The locals keep their cattle in the area on a permanent basis and don’t move them even for seasonal transhumance. This means that they have smaller livestock holdings than the nomadic pastoralists.

The pastoralists who are passing face problems with cattle theft. This was confirmed by numerous sources, including nomadic herders. It was usually individual animals rather than herds that were rustled. The Sarkin Fulani explained that cattle theft was carried out by local herders who know the migrating pastoralists are only in the area temporarily. Pastoral youths in the area know the migrant herders have large numbers of cattle, do not know the terrain well, and do not know the local authorities. They use this tactic to drive them from the area early, as the nomads move away to avoid cattle theft. Sarkin Fulani said he gets reports after they leave the area of Ngaoundal.

The nomadic groups experience attacks in CAR – some have been killed or had their cattle stolen. A group that recently returned from CAR reported that they had lost many cows in attacks by militants. It was widely reported in the field while groups of migrating pastoralists did not tend towards crime or violence, their large herds meant they were liable to put pressure on local pastoral resources in the areas they grazed. They were subject to local extortion both in Cameroon and CAR and this combined with armed conflict in CAR prompted some to return to Nigeria, usually after having been in central Africa for a few years.

The influx of cattle from Nigeria had reportedly reduced available pasture for cattle owned by herders in the areas they pass through. Herders in Cameroon complained that, in addition, the migrant herds often carry diseases which spread to the local cattle. Some local pastoralists had even become farmers due to the death of their animals. There were also reports from farmers about damage to crops caused by nomadic herds, with such cases being resolved through compensation payments, facilitated by the local administration or traditional rulers. Cameroonian authorities, traditional leaders, and pastoral associations were playing an active role in managing tensions when they arise. Criminality was reported by multiple sources to be mainly by local herders stealing cattle from migrant herders as they passed through.⁴⁷

Most of the nomadic herders crossing from Nigeria to Cameroon were trying to reach the CAR rather than stay in Cameroon, but due to insecurity in CAR they frequently moved back and forth across the Cameroon–CAR border, retreating back into Cameroon when violence in CAR threatened them, later returning to the better grazing conditions of the CAR when violence subsided. Mobility was therefore a response to insecurity as well as a means to access pasture.

Box 8: Pastoral experiences in the Central African Republic

Alhaji, an elder in the Adamaoua Region of Cameroon⁵⁰ originated in Nigeria but had migrated through Cameroon to CAR and spent 14 years there before returning to Cameroon due to instability. However, most of his herding group’s cattle, with the exception of a few milking cows, remain in CAR. They send only herders and some supervisors of the herds to CAR to be with the cattle. This is Alhaji’s account of their lives in the CAR.

CAR is like a paradise for any pastoralist who has cattle, because there are good grasses and the environment is very suitable for rearing animals. … There is not much animal disease over there: no flies, no ticks. Our main worry is this issue of instability. The environment is not really conducive for the family to be with the cattle, because of this lack of security and even facilities.

Right now, with the operation of the white soldiers [Russians mercenaries from the Wagner group], they are killing many pastoralists in CAR. This makes it difficult for the pastoralists and real grazers to stay, because they may be attacked at any moment. In some cases, they wipe out whole families, because mostly they attack with helicopters, so anyone can be a victim. This is the major problem we have right now. Some of us have lost all our cattle, with some family members killed.

Borderlands of Nigeria and Niger 

Transhumance in the Nigeria–Niger borderlands is an important part of the pastoral system in both countries. The Nigeria–Niger border is over 1,600 kilometres long and runs through a zone of semi-arid savanna, merging into the Sahel. There is much shared history and culture between people on each side of the border. Communities are linked by family ties, language – predominantly Hausa, with Kanuri towards Lake Chad and Fulfulde among pastoralists – and trade. In the daily lives of many, it is hardly considered a border, especially in the rural areas where transhumant pastoralists cross. However, people are conscious of administrative differences between Nigeria and Niger and the boundary is known.⁵¹ There are several established transhumance routes running on a north-south axis across the border.

Fieldwork indicated an increase in wet season cross-border pastoral movement from northern Nigeria to Niger due to the expansion of cultivation across the far north of Nigeria and clearance of bush that pastoralists previously depended on. The number of livestock herded across the border is not known. XCEPT research investigated the patterns of movement and the main trends. Cross-border transhumance varies from year to year depending on rainfall patterns and political and security conditions in each country. The general perception was that the user rights of pastoralists to land and water were better protected in Niger than in northern Nigeria.⁵²

A herder originally from Damagaram in Niger (Fulani/ Mbororo and identified as Laamanko’en by clan) who was living in Gaya LGA, Kano State, noted that the main advantage of Niger Republic was that there was more law and order there. Notwithstanding the military coup in Niger which occurred after fieldwork, this perception that Niger was more orderly and less violent than Nigeria was widely held. Rules tend to be enforced and the police apprehend criminals. The herder compared it favourably to Nigeria in terms of security, although noting that the challenge in Niger Republic is the scarcity of water in the dry season.⁵³ Nigerian herders have increasing dependence for wet season grazing in Niger Republic, with some herders keeping their stock in Niger all year round for safety and availability of sufficient grazing space.

Potential tensions with rural communities in Niger Republic are mitigated by the dry season movement of some of Niger’s herders into Nigeria, and due to close cultural ties and negotiations between traditional leaders. The presence or absence of conflict largely depends on how mobility is managed – for instance maintaining grazing land rather than turning all land over for cultivation, ensuring stock routes are kept open to reduce encroachment onto farms, and promoting communication between pastoralists and local state authorities or traditional leaders. Timing is also important, as at least some fields of crops need to have been harvested before cattle are brought into an area.

Pastoralists originating in Niger Republic were generally viewed as being peaceful and law-abiding.⁵⁴ More widely, the reduction of pressure in northern Nigeria during the wet season, caused by herders migrating north to Niger, likely reduces conflict with farmers in Nigeria. A large part of cross-border transhumance between Niger and Nigeria is a return movement of livestock into Nigeria in the dry season and a wet season movement of Nigerian herds into Niger. In the dry season, pastoralists in the border areas of Nigeria and Niger feed their cattle on crop residues from irrigated farms. This has become an important source of animal nutrition in the dry season, with parts of northern Nigeria going for seven to eight months without rain.

Some dry season transhumant pastoralists have conflicts with farmers, but for most the pressure in the dry season is mainly from water scarcity and shortage of pasture. They depend increasingly on access to cultivated fields to graze on crop residues. Ensuring that this is facilitated cooperatively and at the right time has become a key local issue between farmers and herders.

Borderlands of Nigeria and the Chad Basin – the Boko Haram insurgency

For the past 15 years, Boko Haram violence has been the major security problem for pastoralists and farmers in Borno State and in much of the Chad Basin, which encompasses the shores, waters and islands of Lake Chad and the river basins that feed the lake. The area covers Borno and Yobe States in north-east Nigeria, parts of the Far North Region of Cameroon, the south-west fringes of Chad Republic, and south-east Diffa Region in Niger Republic.

Borno State, where the insurgency began, has been the most affected by violence, but the other countries on the lake have also suffered attacks and a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict has caused massive displacement. Over a million IDPs are still living in Maiduguri, Borno’s capital, but some went to other parts of Nigeria and several hundred thousand crossed as refugees into Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Most of the Borno section of Lake Chad, along with the eastern part of the Diffa region in Niger, is still under Boko Haram control. This has impacted pastoral livelihoods and movements in the region and in north-east Nigeria through displacement and changes in transhumance patterns, with knock-on effects for farmer-herder relations.

Pastoralism in Borno is in some respects distinct from other parts of northern Nigeria. Firstly, there is a higher diversity of pastoral groups than elsewhere.⁵⁵ In the rest of northern Nigeria, the Fulani are the only group truly specialised in pastoralism. In Borno, pastoral groups include Fulani, Shuwa Arabs, Yedina (Buduma), and several Kanuri-speaking groups: Kwoyam, Badawi, and around the lake: Sugurti, Kanembu, Tummari, Kubri, and Mobbar.⁵⁶ This diversity increases the significance of inter-group dynamics between different pastoralist groups. Secondly, because the Chad Basin comprises territories of four countries, there is more cross-border mobility than in most other parts of Nigeria. Most but not all of the groups listed above extend across borders within the Chad Basin. Thirdly, Lake Chad is an essential resource for pastoralists as well as for farmers and fisherfolks, and the control and governance of the lake and the land around it has direct impacts on pastoral livelihoods, transhumance patterns, and farmer-herder relations in the Chad Basin and more widely.

Borno state

Explaining Boko Haram

Boko Haram (‘Western education is forbidden’ in Hausa) was first named by people in Maiduguri, its original base. With loosely Salafi-jihadi ideological roots, the group emerged in around 2003, preaching in favour of jihad to establish its version of an Islamic system of government. The group announced its jihad against the Nigerian state and other perceived enemies in July 2009, during uprisings in Bauchi, Wudil (Kano State), Potiskum (Yobe State), and Maiduguri (Borno State).⁵⁷

Having begun as an urban movement in cities and towns, insurgency spread to rural areas after July 2009, and especially from 2013, when Boko Haram was driven out of Maiduguri by the civilian population, with some help from the Nigerian military. The insurgency spread across large areas of Borno and bordering states in the north-east, with attacks also in major cities in northern Nigeria and in the federal capital of Abuja and across borders into neighbouring countries of the Chad Basin. Boko Haram fought against the Nigerian military plus vigilantes, and against the militaries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republics, but many bombings, terrorist attacks and massacres by Boko Haram also targeted civilians.

Boko Haram became aligned with the so-called Islamic State in early 2015 and became known as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). In August 2016 it split into two opposing groups: the existing very violent group led since 2009 by Abubakar Shekau, which reverted to its previous name, Jama’at ahl al-Sunna li’l Da’wa wa’l Jihad (JASDJ); and a new group, led by Mamman Nur, which retained the name ISWAP as it gained recognition from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Mamman Nur’s faction opposed the level of brutal and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians under Shekau’s leadership. ISWAP then took control of northern Borno, including Lake Chad, while the Shekau faction, JASDJ, controlled the Sambisa Forest in southern Borno, the Gwoza Hills, and some adjacent areas of central Borno.

From 2016, civilian casualties were much reduced in ISWAP-controlled areas as it attempted to set up a form of Islamic administration that was strict but based on clearer rules. ISWAP tax the population in their areas of control for revenue, and pastoralists are very important to them in that regard. This arrangement has allowed pastoralists and farmers to pursue their livelihoods in places controlled by the non-state armed group, such as at Lake Chad and in neighbouring local government areas. Coexistence remains much more difficult, or impossible, in areas controlled by the rival Shekau faction, which is more predatory and has devastated the rural population of Borno and other areas through persistent attacks, killings, abductions and raiding.

Nur was killed in 2018 and Shekau in 2021. Currently, Bakura Doro is the leader of JASDJ and Habib Yusuf, widely known as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, is the ISWAP leader.⁵⁸ As of August 2023, JASDJ – the Bakura group – has gained more control of Borno and pushed ISWAP back, especially in and around Lake Chad. This has had serious implications for pastoralists, as well as for farmers and fishers, as JASDJ has been raiding them, constraining access to the Lake, which is an important resource. The composition and territorial control of these armed groups is dynamic, with regular changes in their areas of control having serious implications for pastoral mobility and livelihoods.

Impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency on pastoralists

Pastoral men and women from different parts of Borno State and from all ethnic groups describe widespread and persistent attacks by Boko Haram, by the Shekau and now Bakura faction (JASDJ). Pastoralists and farmers have suffered heavy fatalities in violent attacks, loss of wealth and displacement, and reduced access to food, medicine and land.⁵⁹ Shuwa Arabs – pastoralists and farmers – experienced massive displacement and loss of life in Boko Haram attacks. The highest levels of recorded violence were between 2014 and 2016, with 1,900 Shuwa people reported killed,⁶⁰ although attacks on herders and raids on livestock have continued to date. Some Shuwa pastoralists fled to Cameroon as refugees, others moved to Maiduguri and other Nigerian towns as IDPs.

Police reports between 2013 and 2022 record Boko Haram attacks against pastoral Fulani in Borno, stealing entire herds of livestock,⁶¹ with the owners often killed.⁶² However, many pastoralist interlocutors in Borno said that they usually do not report violence because the state authorities do not do anything in response.⁶³

There is no state presence in most rural and areas of Borno or along the borders where Boko Haram operates, except during military operations and at military bases. Most of the bases are in towns, mainly at local government headquarters.⁶⁴ As most violence goes unreported, the actual number of casualties during 15 years of insurgency in Borno State is far higher than the published figures of around 35,000 deaths due to direct violence, and this increases even further when considering the whole of the Chad Basin.

Boko Haram has killed far more men and boys than women and girls, although the latter have suffered from abductions and some have been killed. There are many destitute widows and female-headed IDP households in Maiduguri, including from pastoralist and farming households. Government policies have returned some IDPs to their LGAs of origin, to fortified IDP camps in town, but the rural economy of Borno cannot yet to recover due to continuing violence and insecurity (ICG, 2023, 2024). Humanitarian assistance for the IDPs must remain a priority.

A significant source of Boko Haram funding has come from stealing hundreds of thousands of cattle across the Chad Basin – according to records of pastoral associations and estimates by livestock traders in Maiduguri.⁶⁵ Cattle stolen in Borno are transported to Yobe, Jigawa and Kano, and then on to more distant markets in Nigeria or across the border into Cameroon.⁶⁶ Cattle have a high market value, as well as emotional and social significance for pastoralists. Theft is often impoverishing. For example, a Sugurti elder described a raid at a watering point in 2016 when 1,600 cattle were stolen, none of which were ever recovered.⁶⁷ After their cattle were stolen, they had to turn to farming and petty trading to survive, as very few of them had any animals left.⁶⁸

At Lake Chad, the pastoral groups raising Kuri cattle have also seen their herds depleted by Boko Haram, which has been raiding them throughout the insurgency.⁶⁹ Attacks have occurred in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, and the victims included herders from multiple groups. The number of attacks surged during Shekau’s leadership, and reduced in ISWAP-controlled areas after mid-2016. However, as the Bakura faction maintained a presence at Lake Chad and has advanced and displaced ISWAP, attacks and rustling continue.⁷⁰ There are reportedly few Kuri cattle left around the Nigerian section of the lake today.

Most pastoralists in insurgent-controlled areas try to find ways to survive and access grazing land, or actively resist JASDJ. A minority of pastoralists have been recruited to fight for Boko Haram. The Tummari ethnic group reportedly have generally not joined; a few Sugurtihave joined; while the Mobbar and Buduma have joined in larger numbers. The Bokolo’en accounted for most of the Fulani recruits into Boko Haram in both the Nigeria and Niger Republic sections of the lake.

Herders who joined Boko Haram in some cases raided those who did not. Inter- and intra-group rivalries were exacerbated and reshaped by recruitment into Boko Haram. Some joined ISWAP while others joined JASDJ, but most of the above refers to recruitment into the Shekau faction, and now the Bakura faction (JASDJ), which raids and kills civilians.

Motivation for joining is complex. A possible explanation for the Buduma joining Boko Haram was to reassert their control over the resources of Lake Chad, which they view as their homeland.⁷¹ The shrinking of Lake Chad in the 1970s-90s due to reduced rainfall and abstraction of water from the lake and its feeder rivers has been accompanied by an influx of farmers and herders, including various pastoral Fulani groups moving there in larger numbers, particularly Bokolo’en. Pastoral Fulani increasingly competed with the Buduma and the other local pastoral groups at the lake for pasture, while farmers cultivated the fertile soils in areas that the water had retreated from.⁷² The Buduma have a history as raiders on the lake and the insurgency provided an opportunity for those who joined to raid other groups and push them out.⁷³ Some Buduma displaced, but those who joined Boko Haram maintained allegiance to the Shekau faction and are now aligned to Bakura. In 2023-34 they have been driving ISWAP away from the lake, which is detrimental to most other pastoralists but gives the Buduma and some of the Kanuri-speaking pastoral groups more control over the area.⁷⁴

Pastoralists’ responses to Boko Haram

Pastoralist mobility occurs within certain parameters and known locations where herders have kinship networks and where their cattle are adapted to the ecology. The Boko Haram insurgency blocks movement into some areas. On the Niger Republic and Nigerian sides of the lake, the presence of the Bakura faction of Boko Haram has put some areas off limits and reduced the number of herders coming across from Chad and Cameroon into Nigeria.

Due to persistent raiding, some pastoral Fulani moved to from Borno to other states in Nigeria, or across the border into Cameroon and Chad. Some chose to stay within Borno State, adopting a range of survival strategies in order to navigate, or co-exist with Boko Haram: moving their cattle outside of Borno while the family remained in Maiduguri; moving closer to towns with a military presence, or to areas controlled by ISWAP, away from the remnants of Shekau’s group, which has now regrouped under Bakura Doro.

In areas controlled by ISWAP, pastoralists pay annual zakat if their animals number above 30, as well as other taxes. They are essentially protected by ISWAP and grazing conditions are favourable as many of the larger farmers left, so there is more land, although there are still some incursions by JASDJ. Farmers also have to pay taxes to ISWAP. Herders and farmers interviewed for this study resented having to make these payments, but they need access to the lake and to grazing land and farmland. The Nigerian military complains about people giving money to the insurgents and at times arrests herders as a result. The Bakura faction has now taken control of most of Lake Chad, so access is much reduced, especially on the Nigerian and Niger sides.

Pastoral leaders have been in dialogue with traditional rulers and they have been writing to state officials and the military to try and resolve issues around the arrest of herders grazing in ISWAP areas. Furthermore, as pressure in northern Borno increases due to the advances being made by the Bakura faction, pastoralists from that area may be willing to cooperate with the Nigerian military to liberate the areas under Boko Haram occupation.⁷⁵ At the time of fieldwork, the military looked to ex-Boko Haram fighters for intelligence, but many herders’ stated willingness to mobilise against Boko Haram if given support is an indication of their frustration with the continuing insecurity in the region.

Like other parts of northern Nigeria, Borno has experienced difficulties maintaining grazing reserves and stock routes. Grazing reserves have been encroached by farmers and crops are in some cases destroyed by cattle, with related disputes between farmers and herders. Boko Haram violence reconfigured farmer-herder relations to some extent, but now has become a serious political issue again. From 2016, as herders and subsequently farmers began returning to rural areas that either the military or ISWAP controlled, tensions over land began to rise. Farmers asserted their rights over farms they had abandoned when they fled the countryside for Maiduguri but which in some cases had been taken over for grazing, while herders complained that grazing land in accessible areas of Borno was being cultivated. Such disagreements are exacerbated because much of rural Borno is still too dangerous for productive activities like farming and grazing, so a large number of people are confined to areas considered to be safer.

Areas of significant displacement presented high risks for pastoralists, but also high rewards in terms of plentiful space and pasture. This incentivised some to maintain or increase their presence at Lake Chad, especially where ISWAP established control. Safer parts of Borno included areas of countryside around towns with a strong military presence, such as Monguno, and LGAs controlled more by the military than by Boko Haram. Much of Borno is still insecure, and many farmers and herders have moved into these areas of relative safety where there is at least a degree of military protection. The rural population has become more concentrated in and around Konduga, Jere, Maiduguri, and to some extent Damboa and Gwoza, as well as Monguno in the north. These are also the areas where most farmer-herder conflicts are now reported.⁷⁶

Inter-group tensions reported in these areas have been caused by herders destroying farmers’ crops, and in some cases by farmers obstructing stock routes and taking over grazing land. Conflicts tend to peak in the rainy season after farmers have planted their crops, and in the early dry season before harvest when the potential for mobile herds to damage crops is highest. For pastoralists, the hostility of farmers is an additional complication as they try to adapt to the advance of the Bakura faction, which has cut off most of the lake west of Marte, and arrests by the military and their ex-ISWAP informers. The low rainfall (as reported in 2023) is also a problem for herders and gives the water at the lake added importance even in the wet season. In 2023, pastoralists depended on access to Lake Chad via Marte and Ngala LGAs but if remnants of the Bakura faction displaces ISWAP from there, as they have done in most of Abadam and Kukawa, more herders will relocate at least temporarily to Chad and Cameroon.

Footnotes

³⁹ Interviews in East Region and Adamaoua Region of Cameroon with herders from Kogi State and Niger State, north-central Nigeria, Nov-Dec 2022.

⁴⁰ Jibrilla Cede interview with Jauro Dimndol, Sabon Gari (Cameroon), on the border with Sardauna LGA, 2 March 2023. Migrating herders were also interviewed in Sardauna LGA, Taraba State, on the Mambilla Plateau.

⁴¹ Fieldwork on the Mambilla Plateau, Taraba State, February– April 2023; Gashaka LGA, Taraba State, November– December 2021; and in the Adamaoua, East, and North regions of Cameroon, November and December 2022.

⁴² Field research among herders on each side of the border, in Adamawa State (August–September 2022) and in Cameroon (November–December 2022).

⁴³ This has also been documented in a study by Momale (2016).

⁴⁴ Ethnographic research in pastoral Fulani camps in central and northern Nigeria, with repeat visits, 2012–2023.

⁴⁵ This trend was observed most strongly during research among migrant herders on the Mambilla Plateau, Sardauna LGA, Taraba State, February–April 2023.

⁴⁶ This was apparent during fieldwork in the East and Adamaoua Regions of Cameroon, November–December 2022.

⁴⁷ Fieldwork by in the Adamaoua Region of Cameroon, November–December 2022.

⁴⁸ Interview with Daneejo family head in Ndokayo, 1 December 2022.

⁴⁹ Interview with Sarkin Fulani, Ngaoundal, Adamaoua Region, Cameroon, 28 November 2022.

⁵⁰ Recorded by researchers near Meiganga, Adamaoua Region, Cameroon, 26 November 2022.

⁵¹ On the history of the Niger-Nigeria border, in its nineteenth century context - when the area was part of the Sokoto Caliphate -and its colonial and post-colonial forms, see Lefebvre (2015).

⁵² Fieldwork in pastoral camps, villages and livestock markets in Jigawa State and northern Bauchi State, February–March 2022. The supplemented earlier field visits to those states and to Kano and Yobe States, both of which border Niger.

⁵³ Interview by researchers during field visit to pastoral camps, pastoral settlements and migrating herders in Gaya LGA, Kano State, 24 February 2022.

⁵⁴ There were no complaints from the farmers and local pastoralists about transhumant herders from Niger. They were not seen as troublesome. Fieldwork in Jigawa, Kano and Bauchi States, February–March 2022.

⁵⁵ There is an excellent historical and ethnographic literature on pastoralism in Borno, but very little on the past thirty years. Key studies include Stenning (1957, 1959), Adamu and Kirk-Greene (1986), Braukämper (1996), Baroin et al. (2005), Konrad (2009).

⁵⁶ During field visits to Maiduguri in 2022–23 we interviewed representatives of all these groups.

⁵⁷ On the origins and ideology of Boko Haram, see Mohammed (2014).

⁵⁸ See Crisis Group Africa Briefing no. 196, JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters, 28 March 2024. This briefing gives a detailed outline of the two main insurgent groups in the Chad Basin and their rivalry and infighting.

⁵⁹ A United Nations Development Programme report estimated in 2020 that nearly 350,000 people, 90 per cent of them children under five, have died as a result of a decade of conflict in north-eastern Nigeria, due to the violence itself and, more commonly, to indirect causes (Hanna et al., 2020).

⁶⁰ A documentary source from the Shuwa Arab pastoral association is ‘Preliminary investigations conducted by Al-Hayah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria on the loss of lives, livestock and properties of its members due to Boko Haram activities in Borno State, Nigeria – December 2015’, a 35-page summary document obtained by the author in Maiduguri, June 2016. It names more than 1,900 Shuwa Arab pastoralists who were killed by Boko Haram in Borno State. In the period up to December 2015 it records that Boko Haram destroyed 364 Shuwa Arab villages, burned down more than 19,000 houses, stole some 160,000 cattle, 67,000 sheep and goats, and more than 400,000 sacks of grain.

⁶¹ The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, representing Fulani herders, has case records, but these only scratch the surface because most cases are not reported to associations or government.

⁶² For example, in a letter to the Borno State governor, it was reported that ‘on Friday 13th December, 2019, gunmen suspected to be members of Boko Haram invaded the Fulani community at Fuye village (Gamboru Ngala LGA) and killed 19 children ranging from age 7 years and above.’ Report of Killing of Fulani Herders by Boko Haram at Gamboru Ngala LGA, Borno State. Letter to the Borno State Governor, Prof. Baba Gana Umara Zulum. Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, North East Zonal Office, 4 January 2020.

⁶³ Interviews in Maiduguri, May 2023.

⁶⁴ Interviews with respondents from LGAs in rural Borno and with CJTF vigilantes in Maiduguri, 2022-3. ICG (2023) also touches on the state presence.

⁶⁵ Interview with a leading livestock trader in KasuwanShanu (Maiduguri livestock market), 10 November 2022, and documentation from pastoral associations in Borno State, op. cit. and below.

⁶⁶ Interviews with pastoralists whose cattle were stolen, and with a Civilian Joint Task Force leader from Gwoza, Borno State, November 2022 and May 2023.

⁶⁷ Interview with a Sugurti pastoral leader, Maiduguri, 8 May 2023.

⁶⁸ Interview with a Sugurti pastoral leader from Monguno LGA, Maiduguri, 8 May 2023.

⁶⁹ A record compiled by the Kuri Development Association – whose members include herders from all the groups raising Kuri cattle – lists 34 separate attacks by Boko Haram from 2015–2017, resulting in the killing of pastoralists and the alleged theft of a total of 36,206 Kuri cattle.

⁷⁰ Letter by Jibrin Gunda & Co. on behalf of the Kuri Development Association to the Inspector General of Police, Force Headquarters, Abuja, 1 June 2022.

⁷¹ This was expressed by Fulani pastoralists during interviews in Maiduguri in May 2023, as ISWAP had lost ground to the late Shekau faction at the lake. The Buduma were associated with the latter whereas the Fulani found it easier to coexist with ISWAP.

⁷² Information here based on multiple interviews in Maiduguri with pastoralists from the Lake, May 2023.

⁷³ Citing historical literature, anthropologist Catherine Baroin wrote of the Buduma: ‘They used to be extremely efficient raiders, dashing out from the lake waters at night, taking back cattle and people on their reed-boats and disappearing into a frightening natural environment where no mainland dweller ever dared follow them’ (Baroin, 2005: 200).

⁷⁴ Interviews with pastoral leaders in Maiduguri, including Buduma leaders, May 2023.

⁷⁵ There are precedents for this, where in parts of Taraba, Plateau and Bauchi States, herders have been active as vigilantes – notably through the organisation TabitalPulaaku – working closely with soldiers to identify and confront armed bandits.

⁷⁶ Interviews with herders and farmers in Maiduguri, May 2023.