It will take time for peace talks with the guerrillas to be reactivated, given the precedents of the last attempt. For this to happen, some conditions need to be in place. The first is a change in the correlation of forces and military resources of the parties in conflict in favour of the state. The state is constitutionally obliged to impose law and order in the whole country, and has to commit itself wholeheartedly to stopping the violence of all illegal actors using all the legitimate methods at its disposal. We know that the probability of a conflict being solved increases substantially when one of the parties perceives that it is militarily weaker and that it could be advisable to negotiate. Another condition is that the insurgency understands they do not have the support of the population that they claim to represent, nor the support of external allies. An entire population united around a state policy which rejects the use of violence and terror as a political weapon should induce the insurgency to negotiate. A third condition is the intervention of a neutral third party in the form of a person or entity with sufficient influence and moral stature, initially to bring the parties together and develop contacts through discreet channels, and later to mediate in a negotiation process.
To achieve progress in future talks the actual definition of peace needs to be a starting point. The maximalist version adopted during the last failed talks was unhelpful because it defined an unrealistic design for a new country. The aim should be an end to hostilities and the reintegration of the demobilised fighters into the democratic system and a normal life. This should follow accords that include ‘political favourability’, finally allowing the reintegrated members to gain access to the various arenas of political representation. Other factors and circumstances can influence the achievement of a politically negotiated solution. The state has the constitutional duty to improve the capacity of the military forces to protect civilians and fight violence from illegal armed groups across the whole country. International pressure, in the current context of zero tolerance of violence and terror as political instruments, needs to continue. The sources of financial support for violence must be blocked.
On the guerrillas’ side, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) lack of capacity to convert its military power into political advances is evident, as is its failure to shift from a guerrilla war to the more advanced stage of a war of movements. Desertions are increasing, and every day there are more obvious signs of fatigue, demoralisation and logistical difficulties within the guerrilla groups. This should also lead them to negotiate. Talks on the demobilisation of the self-defence groups have begun, without first offering them political recognition, which would have been impossible. The process will be slow and full of hurdles, originating from their long history of serious human rights violations and crimes. Achieving real disarmament and reintegration, while complying with principles of truth, justice, and reparations, will be a positive step towards peace.
The business community will contribute effectively to the achievement of peace in multiple ways. It will support the necessary institutional reforms to attack exclusion, poverty and inequality, and to guarantee human rights and coexistence. It will offer solutions to post-conflict problems and inspire society to make peace the great national project.