After a long period without progress in the talks between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), four factors came together from 1997 onwards to encourage the parties to return to the negotiating table. Firstly, people recognised that there was a stalemate following the major offensive operations of 1995-96, in which the SPLM/A recaptured a number of government-held areas. As it became clear that neither side would gain a decisive victory, the door to the negotiation process started to come back into view. Secondly, there was a substantial change of personnel in Khartoum; with few of the previous negotiators remaining, there was a knock at that door. Thirdly, mounting international pressure forced the door to be unlocked, if not opened: this began with pressure from the African states, especially President Obasanjo of Nigeria from 1999; pressure from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) states followed as the Kenyans appointed General Sumbeiywo in 2001 and the IGAD group was reinvigorated; and finally came pressure from the US Congress, whose representatives sympathised with what they saw as Dr John Garang's struggle against the forceful spread of Islam. Ultimately, Dr John always had in the back of his mind the notion that a negotiated settlement would be the only way to end the war. He had expected the door to negotiations to be available and so was not surprised when it started to open.
Although IGAD was a regional body not normally mandated or equipped to run a mediation process, the two parties were persuaded to accept its mediation because it had a clear incentive to see a peaceful solution in Sudan, as well as enjoying the full support of the international community. Also, IGAD recognised the limitations of its size and experience and welcomed international support in the form of the IGAD Partners' Forum (Italy, Norway, the UK and the USA). This reassured both sides that the process would be taken seriously and properly funded, unlike the recent Abuja process for Darfur.
The USA in particular was important in garnering international support for the mediation process and in demonstrating its commitment to the negotiations in a number of ways. John Garang's campaign for a secular southern Sudan in which religion would be a matter of private preference rather than an imposition of the state resonated with US liberals, while their religious radicals were keen to avoid the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Special Envoy John Danforth's initiative was a further guarantee that the US would not lose interest after the initial Machakos Protocol had been signed.