A casualty of the cold war
During the Cold War, world powers frequently employed ideological rhetoric to justify the forceful pursuit of perceived geopolitical and economic interests. Cold War interventions in the Third World were generally extremely partisan and often led to the intensification and militarisation of existing conflicts. The Guatemalan war ran roughly parallel to the Cold War and in some ways was paradigmatic of these trends.
In 1952, the elected Guatemalan government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán passed an agrarian reform law which sought to re-distribute to landless campesinos all unused land from holdings over 223 acres. At this time, the US-based United Fruit Company (UFC) was Guatemala's biggest landowner, but no more than 15% of its 550,000 acres were under cultivation. As a result, the government expropriated 400,000 acres, offering compensation based on the UFC's own figures which had under-valued the land for tax purposes.
To counter the expropriation, the UFC called on its allies in the US government, in particular Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In June 1954, a CIA-sponsored mercenary army moved into Guatemala from neighbouring Honduras to help overthrow the government. Because the ruling coalition of President Arbenz included members of the Communist Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), it was possible to justify the intervention as part of a broader strategy to contain the ubiquitous 'communist menace'.
United States economic and military assistance to Guatemala 1946-1994 (millions of US dollars, 1970 rate)
|
average per year
|
1946-49
|
2.3
|
1950-54
|
1.1
|
1955-59
|
23.1
|
1960-64
|
20.6
|
1965-69
|
30.4
|
1970-74
|
21.0
|
1975-79
|
13.7
|
1980-84
|
6.9
|
1985-89
|
46.7
|
1990-94
|
24.9
|
All figures come from the Statistical Abstract on Latin America, volumes 30 and 33, published at the University of California in Los Angeles.
Once Arbenz had been forced from office, his land reforms were immediately reversed. Thereafter, a loose alliance of conservative military and private sector interests began to consolidate its grip on power, controlling or removing successive elected governments. Reformist dissent was gradually eliminated both within the army and in civil society, most of which was proscribed or destroyed through targeted repression. With extensive military and economic assistance from the United States, Guatemala became the national security state par excellence, designed to limit any popular protest which might threaten the status quo.
Gradually, political space became so restricted that many deemed armed resistance the only viable means of expressing opposition to the authorities. In 1962, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) was established, a coalition of rebel movements comprising army dissidents, radical students and left-wing political activists, all of whom were middle-class ladinos. The FAR espoused the foco theory of Che Guevara and others which held that the justice of the revolutionary cause would be immediately evident to campesinos, workers and the poor, thus sparking spontaneous insurrection. While relying for their support on rural communities, typically in non-indigenous areas such as the Eastern highlands, they communicated with their nascent support base through the ideologies of Marxism and liberation theology. As such, they tended to approach ethnic and cultural oppression within the framework of class struggle.
Although breaking from the Guatemalan Communist Party in 1968, the FAR drew moral and logistic support from the revolutionary regime in Cuba, reinforcing the view that Guatemala's war was a zero-sum conflict between the forces of capitalism and communism. After a few early successes, the FAR was largely wiped out by a counter-insurgency campaign in which US special forces played a prominent role.
Dispossession, exclusion and the Maya
The Cold War and the 1954 coup re-moulded and invigorated a number of structures within Guatemalan society which had long provoked and propagated the widespread use of violence. Tensions, then as now, stemmed from a highly unequal distribution of resources whereby less than 3% of the population own 70% of arable land and a staggering 80% live in poverty. This situation has itself retained a strong ethnic dimension.
In the centuries following the Spanish conquest of the 1520s, the Mayan majority in Guatemala successfully avoided the fate of assimilation or destruction which met many indigenous peoples in Latin America and elsewhere. This is partly because the conquistadors showed relatively little interest in their mountainous homelands, and partly due to the development of a pervasive Mayan culture of preservation, syncretism and resistance. Nevertheless, the Maya lost large areas of their communal lands to the invaders and were regularly subjected to forced labour on the colonial plantations.
Colonial economic structures survived in Guatemala beyond Central American independence in 1821, well into the mid 1800s. In the latter years of the nineteenth century, however, a qualitative change occurred in economic policy, linked to the expansion of coffee growing. One of the principles enunciated by the ideologues and politicians of the time was that private ownership of the land guaranteed greater productivity. With this pretext, powerful agribusiness interests allied to the state forced many communities to divide up their communal land, while direct expropriations were accelerated. A convenient consequence of these reforms was the increased availability of campesinos for work on the coffee plantations.
Strengthened by successive governments in the early years of this century, coffee production and the US-owned 'banana enclaves' remained central to Guatemala's economic 'modernisation' and its increasing integration into international markets. While liberal rhetoric glossed over economic exploitation and social marginalisation, landless Maya continued to be subjected to regimes of forced labour and indentured servitude which were only legally abolished in 1944.
The ill-fated land reforms of President Arbenz were inaugurated with the intention of speeding economic growth, the redistribution of resources and industrialisation. Taken with other structural reforms, it was also hoped they might lessen the dependence of the Guatemalan economy on foreign capital. These reforms were the first and only serious attempt to rectify the imbalances in Guatemalan land usage and their reversal meant that, at the time of the last land census (1979), around 90 per cent of Guatemala's farms were too small to support the average family.
While economically exploited, the Maya have also been subject to a political culture of racism and exclusion, underpinned by a state which promotes the culture, values, customs and interests of the minority ladino population. As a consequence, constitutional guarantees of political participation, the rule of law and social equality have never been realised for the Maya.