In the East and Central Africa programme region, 2012 was a year of ups and downs, peaks and troughs of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity. The year saw a rising tide of other problems such as explosions of conflict elsewhere, both in affected states and beyond.

The LRA were high on some agendas at the beginning of 2012 but escalating conflict in DR Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), a stand-off of sorts in Sudan plus the crises in Mali, North Africa and the Middle East have all focused international attention away from Joseph Kony and his self-proclaimed army.

Disrupting lives and disturbing livelihoods

Recorded LRA activity paints a picture of continued attacks and movements across affected areas. In the last year 202 people were attacked resulting in around 80 people killed. Most concerning is the resulting numbers of displaced communities and associated human flows of either into camps for internally displaced people, across borders or further into the bush.

In the last year more than 5,700 people have been displaced across affected areas. Only 176 people have been returned in the last year. Clearly the LRA are still a threat.

However these figures cloud the situation in some areas and hide some of the gains, most significantly in South Sudan and Uganda.

South Sudan has been almost free of recorded LRA abductions, attacks and killings. Far fewer people have been displaced as well. In Uganda there has been no recorded LRA activity except for the return of a high profile LRA commander – Caesar Achellam.

Weak states and a plethora of non-state actors: DRC and CAR

LRA activity in the DRC and CAR has been far more common than in other affected states. In the last year the LRA killed more than 50 people in CAR and over 30 people in DRC. Both states have recorded massive displacement; over 2,000 in CAR and over 3,300 in DRC.

LRA activity has been limited to peripheral and borderland areas of both countries where state control or even presence is minimal a best.

Even the deployment of 100 US military advisors has not resulted in any real significant gains. The LRA continue to operate in small groups and have a disproportionate effect in terms of their numbers.

The North East of Orientale province in DRC and South East CAR provide perfect sanctuary for LRA rebels. The areas lack infrastructure and basic state security institutions. In addition both governments have failed to deal with non-state armed actors, including the LRA, resulting in a pool of un-demobilised armed men and boys operating over vast swathes of land with near impunity.

These include the LRA but also poachers, disgruntled security forces, local defence units in lieu of effective state security institutions, and nomadic armed groups such as the Mbororo.

The result is an extremely murky picture in which attacks and banditry are rife.

Those responsible are usually hard to identify. Violence occurs to eke out a survival, in retaliation to (or perceived) hostility from other communities and to impose social dominance at a very local level, from village, to community, to sub-prefecture, to province and finally to the national level.

Both countries have also suffered from serious insurrections forcing both governments in Kinshasa and Bangui to prioritise other issues. The M23 rebellion in DRC from early 2012 diverted attention in Kinshasa but also from regional states and abroad to deal with the explosion of conflict in North Kivu province

As a result, Congolese army units left a security vacuum when they were moved out of LRA affected areas to deal with the new rebellion.

In similar circumstances a rebellion flared up in CAR and threatened to topple the government, forcing Bangui to redeploy troops away from LRA affected areas. Negotiations continue but clearly the authorities in Bangui have prioritised dealing with the Seleka rebel alliance to the detriment of the LRA issue.

A beacon of hope? South Sudan and Uganda.

LRA activity has been minimal in South Sudan and non-existent in Uganda in 2012. Zero attacks have been recorded in 2012 in both states. Uganda has been free of LRA activities since 2006 indicating a move from conflict resolution to the development of Northern Uganda.

South Sudan, although still affected by the LRA, has managed to keep them at bay. The young country has seen one of Africa’s most violent civil wars with continued hostility and worse from the North.

Severe underdevelopment plagues the new state. It is especially difficult to provide security, infrastructure and basic social services to the population, most of which is rural.

This situation should provide perfect sanctuary for the LRA, so the fact that activity has been kept at a minimum is extremely good news.

It seems that the Ugandan Army (UPDF) and the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) have worked very well together along side some local defence units (Arrow Boys) in LRA affected areas. In addition civil society groups have been at the forefront of spreading awareness to communities and encouraging defections. These gains must be consolidated.

If Uganda but more importantly South Sudan can maintain low levels of attacks and displaced, defections and returns should follow. Furthermore the effective relationship between the SPLA, UPDF and local defence units must continue alongside the initiatives of local civil society organisations.

Conclusions

The LRA clearly remains a threat to populations. The rebel movement continues to operate with impunity in peripheral areas of East and Central Africa. Most activity is limited to DRC and CAR where state weakness combined with a rising tide of other non-state armed groups provides perfect sanctuary for the LRA.

South Sudan and Uganda are a different story however and have made considerable gains against the LRA, not least due to regional cooperation in tandem with local civil society initiatives.

The top–down approach has worked in some areas to an extent but real gains have been made by including a bottom-up element.

The Arrow Boys in South Sudan plus the reconciliation and development activities of civil society groups in South Sudan and Northern Uganda attest to this.

If significant action is to be taken against the LRA elsewhere, top-down action must take on board bottom-up realities in order to be effective. Attention must be paid to the views of those affected by instability and the ongoing threat of violence.

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