Accord - Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent (policy brief)

Apr 2014
This 6-page policy brief summarises the findings of Accord 25 - Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent. It argues that a legitimacy lens should be applied to peace processes by paying attention to priorities of context, consent and change.

The ceasefire is essential – but what should happen next for peace in Afghanistan?

The recent experience of a temporary ceasefire by both the Afghan Government, and, for the first time since they were ousted from power in 2001, the Taliban, could be a first step on an incremental journey towards peace. But what should happen next and how can this gradual progress towards peace be supported?

References

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

Further reading relating to the Accord 27 Incremental Peace in Afghanistan.

Key texts

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

Key texts drawn from the Accord 27 Incremental Peace in Afghanistan.

Profiles

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

A section providing concise profiles of prominent Afghan political actors and institutions.

Glossary

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

A glossary providing brief explanations of terms relating to prominent Afghan groups, customs and political action.

Chronology of major political events in contemporary Afghanistan

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

This section sets out a chronology of major political events in contemporary Afghanistan, from 1747 to April 2018.

Conclusion: Incremental peace in practice

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018

Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham concludes key lessons from Accord 27 Incremental peace in Afghanistan - with thanks for substantive input and ideas from Professor Michael Semple.

On war, peace and transition

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan
Jun 2018
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar describes some of his perspectives on war, peace and political transition in Afghanistan, drawn from a conversation with Accord in April 2018.
 
Mr Hekmatyar states that the lack of official Taliban endorsement of peace negotiations obscures the reality that a majority within the movement want to see an end to the war.